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a b s t r a c t 
Modern investors face a high-dimensional prediction problem: thousands of observable 
variables are potentially relevant for forecasting. We reassess the conventional wisdom on 
market efficiency in light of this fact. In our equilibrium model, N assets have cash flows 
that are linear in J characteristics, with unknown coefficients. Risk-neutral Bayesian in- 
vestors learn these coefficients and determine market prices. If J and N are comparable in 
size, returns are cross-sectionally predictable ex post. In-sample tests of market efficiency 
reject the no-predictability null with high probability, even though investors use informa- 
tion optimally in real time. In contrast, out-of-sample tests retain their economic meaning. 
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cisions require predictions for which large numbers of 
variables could potentially be relevant, but the exact re- 
lationship between predictors and forecast target is un- 
known and must be learned from observed data. In this 
paper, we argue that to understand market outcomes 
in such settings, it is important to take into account 
the high-dimensional nature of decision-makers’ prediction 
problem. 
We demonstrate this in an asset-pricing setting. We 
show that properties of asset prices are strongly affected 
by the dimensionality of investors’ prediction problem. 
Conventional notions of how to test market efficiency and 
how to interpret pricing anomalies break down in the 
high-dimensional case. 
To price risky assets such as stocks, investors must fore- 
cast the future cash flows generated by these assets. In 
our model, cash-flow growth rates of a cross-section of N
firms are a linear function of J firm characteristics that are 
fixed over time. Investors are Bayesian, homogeneous, and 
risk neutral; they price stocks based on the predictive dis- article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
fficiency in the age of big data, Journal of Financial Eco- 
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tribution of cash flows. Realized asset returns in this set-
ting are simply equal to investors’ forecast errors. If in-
vestors knew the coefficients of the predictive model, they
could form expectations of cash-flow growth, and hence
price assets, in such a way that returns would not be pre-
dictable in the cross-section. This is the conventional ra-
tional expectations (RE) equilibrium that is the founda-
tion for typical market efficiency tests. Similarly, if J is
small relative to N, investors could estimate the parameters
of their cash-flow forecasting model with great precision,
leading to asset prices that are close to those in the RE
equilibrium. 
In reality, however, investors face a myriad of poten-
tial predictor variables that could be relevant in construct-
ing such forecasts. In other words, J is not small rela-
tive to N. As technology has improved, the set of available
and potentially valuation-relevant predictor variables has
expanded enormously over time. Textual analysis, satel-
lite imagery, social media data, and many other new data
sources yield a wealth of information. But in order to use
these sources of information in a forecasting model, in-
vestors must estimate the relation between these signals
and future cash flows. This is a high-dimensional learning
problem. The number of potential predictor variables could
easily surpass the number of assets whose cash flow data
is available to estimate this relation. 
Machine learning methods handle this issue by im-
posing some regularization on the estimation, for exam-
ple by shrinking parameter estimates towards a fixed tar-
get or by searching for a sparse model representation that
includes only a small subset of variables from a much
larger set of potential predictors. With the goal of optimiz-
ing out-of-sample forecasting performance, regularization
lets the learner trade off the costs of downweighting cer-
tain pieces of information against the benefit of reduced
parameter-estimation error. In a Bayesian interpretation,
shrinkage reflects informative prior beliefs: when forecast-
ers know, based on economic plausibility considerations,
that forecasting model parameters cannot have arbitrar-
ily large magnitudes, their posterior beliefs are shrunk to-
wards the prior mean. 
Shrinkage ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the ef-
fects of parameter uncertainty on asset prices in the
high-dimensional case. Relative to the RE equilibrium, as-
set prices are distorted by two components. First, noise
in the past cash-flow growth observations that investors
learn from will have, by chance, some correlation with
the J predictor variables. This induces error in investors’
parameter estimates, and hence an asset price distor-
tion, that is correlated with the J predictor variables.
Shrinkage downweights this estimation error component,
but it also gives rise to a second distortion compo-
nent because shrinkage implies underweighting the pre-
dictive information in the J predictors. Naturally, this sec-
ond component, too, is correlated with the J predictor
variables. 
To stack the deck against return predictability, we en-
dow investors with prior beliefs that are objectively cor-
rect in the sense that the coefficients of the cash flow–
generating model are drawn from this prior distribution.
Investors also know that this model is linear. With this ob-2 jective prior, the optimal amount of shrinkage exactly bal- 
ances the two components in such a way that investors’ 
forecast errors, and hence also asset returns, are unpre- 
dictable out-of-sample. 
The fact that returns are not predictable out-of-sample, 
however, does not imply that there is no in-sample pre- 
dictability. An econometrician conducting an in-sample 
predictability test uses data that had not been available 
to investors in real time when they priced assets. In an 
RE setting, this would not matter, because investors would 
already have perfect knowledge of model parameters. Ap- 
proximately, the same would be true in a low-dimensional 
setting with small J and large N, where investors would be 
able to estimate forecasting-model parameters with high 
precision. But in a high-dimensional setting, the econome- 
trician’s ability to see data realized ex post, after investors’ 
pricing decisions are made, gives her a substantial advan- 
tage. 
To show this, we consider an econometrician who col- 
lects asset price data from our model economy ex post and 
runs in-sample regressions to test whether the J firm char- 
acteristics cross-sectionally predict returns. When J is van- 
ishing in size relative to N, there is almost no predictabil- 
ity: with N → ∞ and J fixed, the predictability test would 
reject the null with test size close to the chosen signif- 
icance level (e.g., 0.05). In contrast, in high-dimensional 
asymptotics, where N, J → ∞ jointly, with their ratio J/N
converging to a fixed number, the econometrician would 
reject the no-predictability null hypothesis, in the limit, 
with probability one. In simulations, we show that these 
high-dimensional asymptotic results are a good approx- 
imation for the case of finite N with J comparable in 
size to N. We obtain rejection probabilities close to one 
in these simulations, too. Importantly, the high rejection 
rates in-sample tests are not caused by distortions in the 
sampling properties of the econometrician’s test statis- 
tics. Instead, the high rejection rates correctly reflect the 
fact that equilibrium asset prices contain in-sample pre- 
dictable components that are large in a high-dimensional 
setting. 
The situation is different for out-of-sample tests. In 
our model economy, a portfolio formed based on the 
econometrician’s predictive regression estimates up to pe- 
riod t , with positive weights for stocks with positive pre- 
dicted returns and negative weights for stocks with neg- 
ative expected returns, has an average return of zero 
in the subsequent period t + 1 . In other words, returns 
are not predictable out-of-sample. This is true, too, in 
the high-dimensional asymptotic case. Intuitively, since 
Bayesian investors optimally use information available to 
them and price assets such that returns are not pre- 
dictable under their predictive distribution, an econome- 
trician who is restricted to constructing return forecasts 
using only data that had been available to investors in 
real time is not able to predict returns out-of-sample 
either. 
These results illustrate forcefully that the economic 
content of the (semi-strong) market efficiency notion that 
prices “fully reflect” all public information ( Fama, 1970 ) is 
not clear in this high-dimensional setting, even though we 
abstract from the joint hypothesis problem by assuming 
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that investors are risk-neutral. 1 Does “fully reflect” mean
that investors know the parameters of the cash flow–
prediction model? Or does “fully reflect” mean that in-
vestors employ Bayesian updating when they learn from
data about these parameters? The null hypothesis in a
vast empirical literature in asset pricing, including return
predictability regressions, event studies, and asset-pricing
model estimation based on orthogonality conditions, is the
former version of the market efficiency hypothesis. Our re-
sults show that testing and rejecting this version has little
economic content in a high-dimensional setting. An appar-
ent rejection of market efficiency might simply represent
the unsurprising consequence of investors not having pre-
cise knowledge of the parameters of a data-generating pro-
cess that involves thousands of predictor variables. 
Empirical discoveries of new cross-sectional return pre-
dictors that are statistically significant according to con-
ventional in-sample tests are therefore less interesting in
a high-dimensional world. From the perspective of our
model, it is not surprising that the technology-driven ex-
plosion in the number of predictor variables available to
investors has coincided with an explosion in the number of
return predictors that are found significant in asset-pricing
studies ( Cochrane, 2011; Harvey et al., 2016 ). Even with-
out p-hacking, multiple testing, or data mining ( Lo and
MacKinlay, 1990; Harvey et al., 2016; Chordia et al., 2019 ),
evidence of cross-sectional return predictability from in-
sample regressions does not tell us much about the ex-
pected returns that investors perceived ex ante at the time
they priced assets. Thus, out-of-sample tests (such as those
in McLean and Pontiff, 2016 ) gain additional importance in
the age of Big Data. 
Researchers are often skeptical of out-of-sample tests.
In the case where a fixed underlying process is generating
returns (as would be the case in many RE models), in- and
out-of-sample methods test the same hypothesis, and in-
sample tests are more powerful because they use the avail-
able data to the fullest extent. As a consequence, it is not
clear why one would want to focus on out-of-sample tests
( Inoue and Kilian, 2005; Campbell and Thompson, 2008;
Cochrane, 2008; Hansen and Timmermann, 2015 ). In con-
trast, if investors face a high-dimensional learning prob-
lem, substantial in-sample predictability can coexist with
absence of out-of-sample predictability. In-sample and out-
of-sample tests examine fundamentally different hypothe-
ses in this case. This provides a clear motivation for out-
of-sample testing. 
We show that out-of-sample portfolio returns can iso-
late predictable components of returns that reflect risk
premia or behavioral biases. Unlike in-sample estimates,
the out-of-sample estimates are not distorted by investors’
learning-induced forecast errors. We also show that if the
econometrician applies shrinkage similar to ridge regres-
sion in the in-sample return prediction regression, with
the penalty hyperparameter estimated via cross-validation,
then the portfolio return based on these shrinkage es-1 The joint hypothesis problem ( Fama, 1970 ) refers to the problem that 
the econometrician studying asset prices does not know the model that 
determines risk premia required by risk-averse investors. 
3 timates can be equivalent to an out-of-sample portfo- 
lio return. Within our Bayesian learning setting, this re- 
sult therefore provides an economic interpretation of ap- 
proaches that use cross-validation ( Kozak et al., 2020 ) or 
closely related methods ( Chinco et al., 2021 ) to estimate 
prior beliefs for cross-sectional return prediction. 
We illustrate the different perspectives provided by in- 
and out-of-sample tests with an empirical example. In 
the cross-section of U.S. stocks, we consider each stock’s 
history of monthly simple and squared returns over the 
previous 120 months as a set of return predictors. Run- 
ning a ridge regression over a full five decade sample, the 
in-sample coefficient estimates pick up the most promi- 
nent past return-based anomalies in the literature, includ- 
ing momentum ( Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Novy-Marx, 
2012 ), long-term reversals ( DeBondt and Thaler, 1985 ), 
and momentum seasonality ( Heston and Sadka, 2008 ). In 
other words, there is substantial in-sample predictability. 
In terms of out-of-sample predictability, the picture looks 
very different. Using rolling regressions over 20-year win- 
dows to estimate prediction model coefficients and then 
using those to predict returns in subsequent periods, we 
find that predictability is generally much weaker out-of- 
sample than in-sample. Moreover, there is substantial de- 
cay over time. While some out-of-sample predictability ex- 
ists in the early decades of the sample, it is basically nil in 
recent years. This suggests that there may be little reason 
to seek risk-based or behavioral explanations of the cross- 
sectional predictability that shows up in the in-sample 
analysis. 
One potential explanation for the out-of-sample pre- 
dictability in the earlier parts of the sample may be that 
investors several decades ago were not able to process the 
information in each stock’s price history as effectively as 
investors today. One can think of this as bounded ratio- 
nality that induces excessive shrinkage or sparsity of in- 
vestors’ forecasting models, along the lines of Sims (2003) , 
Gabaix (2014) , and Molavi et al. (2020) . We show in our 
simulations that sparsity or shrinkage beyond the level 
called for by objectively correct Bayesian priors leads to 
positive out-of-sample return predictability. 
Overall, our results suggest that in-sample cross- 
sectional return predictability tests are ill-suited for un- 
covering return premia that require explanations based on 
priced risk exposures or behavioral biases. This is not to 
say that all of the documented patterns in the literature 
are explainable with learning and will not persist out-of- 
sample. But it is important to obtain other supporting evi- 
dence beyond in-sample predictability tests. If predictabil- 
ity associated with a predictor variable persists out-of- 
sample, if there is a compelling theoretical motivation, or 
if other types of data point to a risk or behavioral bias ex- 
planation (e.g., economic risk exposures, data on investor 
expectations), the case for a risk premium or a persistent 
behavioral bias is much stronger. 
The insight in our analysis that learning can induce 
in-sample return predictability relates to an earlier litera- 
ture that studies learning-induced return predictability in 
low-dimensional time-series settings with few return pre- 
dictors (e.g., Timmermann, 1993; Lewellen and Shanken, 
2002; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2016 ). These earlier time- 
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series analyses do not address the question of how learn-
ing affects asset prices and the properties of in- and out-
of-sample return predictability tests in a high-dimensional
cross-sectional setting. This is the focus of our paper. 
Our approach has antecedents elsewhere in the liter-
ature. Aragones et al. (2005) and Al-Najjar (2009) treat
decision-makers as statisticians who have to learn from
observed data in a non-Bayesian high-dimensional setting.
Their focus is on conditions under which disagreement be-
tween agents can persist in the long run. Klein (2019) and
Calvano et al. (2018) focus on strategic interaction of ma-
chine learning pricing algorithms in product markets. In-
vestors in our setting face a simpler learning problem
within a Bayesian linear framework and without strategic
interactions. Even in this simple setting, important pricing
implications emerge. 
All proofs are in the appendix. 
2. Bayesian pricing in a high-dimensional setting 
Consider an economy in discrete time, t ∈ { 1 , 2 , . . . } ,
with N assets. Each asset is associated with a vector of J
firm characteristics observable to investors that we collect
in the N × J matrix X . The assets pay dividends, collected
in the vector y t , whose growth y t = y t − y t−1 is partly
predictable based on X : 
Assumption 1 . 
y t = X g + e t , e t ∼ N(0 , e ) , 
rank ( X ) = J, 1 
NJ 
tr X ′ X = 1 . (1)
The set of characteristics is potentially very large, but
for simplicity we assume J < N. It would be relatively
straightforward to extend the framework to allow for J ≥ N,
but the main points can be seen more clearly in the sim-
pler J < N setting. The set of characteristics in X exhausts
the set of variables that investors can condition on. Due to
technological change, this set could change as previously
unavailable predictors become available, so we will be con-
cerned with the behavior of prices for various values of J. 
The assumption that 1 NJ tr X 
′ X = 1 is a normalization
that defines a natural scale for the characteristics. For ex-
ample, it holds if characteristics are scaled to have unit
norm (i.e., if 1 N 
∑ N 












x 2 n j = 1 . 
We assume that the characteristics associated with a
firm are constant over time for simplicity. In reality, firms’
characteristics change. But as long as investors know the
firm’s characteristics at every point in time, one can ac-
commodate this in our setting by thinking of y t as a vector
of payoffs for hypothetical characteristics-constant firms.
We would have to reshuffle firms each period so that each
element of y t is always associated with the same charac-
teristics. 
We further make the following assumption: 4 Assumption 2 . Investors are risk-neutral and the interest 
rate is zero. 
By abstracting from risk premia, we intentionally make 
it easy for an econometrician to test market efficiency in 
our setting. With risk-neutral investors, there is no joint 
hypothesis problem due to unknown risk–pricing models. 
Yet, as we will show, interpretation of standard market ef- 
ficiency tests is still tricky. 
We focus on the pricing of one-period dividend strips 
so that p t represents the vector of prices, at time t , of 
claims to dividends paid at time t + 1 . We think of one 
period in this model as a long time span, say a decade, 
so that the errors in e t are actually the averages of the er- 
rors one would find by sampling at higher frequencies over 
many shorter subperiods. With this interpretation in mind, 
we can then think of the dividend strip payoff as a long- 
lived stock’s cash flows compressed into a single cash flow 
at the typical duration of a stock (e.g., perhaps a decade). 
The price vector is then equal to the vector of next- 
period expected dividends, 
p t = ̃  E t y t+1 = y t + ̃  E t y t+1 = y t + ̃  E t ( X g + e t+1 ) . 
This formulation encompasses a range of possible assump- 
tions about the process by which investors’ expectations ˜ E t [ ·] are formed. 
In a rational expectations model, for example, investors 
know g , so ˜ E t ( X g + e t+1 ) = X g . The dividend strip price is 
therefore p t = y t + X g , and realized price changes r t+1 = 
y t+1 − p t = y t+1 − X g = e t+1 are unpredictable with X . 
This is the usual null hypothesis that underlies tests based 
on orthogonality conditions and Euler equations. 
However, we focus on the realistic case where investors 
do not know g . They therefore face a learning problem in 
pricing assets. They can learn about g by observing the re- 
alizations of { y s } t 1 and the characteristics X . (We assume 
that investors know e .) We then have ˜ E t ( X g + e t+1 ) = 
X ̃  gt , where ˜ gt represents investors’ posterior mean of g at 
time t , after learning from historical data. 
If J is close to (or perhaps even larger than) N, run- 
ning an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate 
g would not give investors useful forecasts. For example, 
with J = N, a cross-sectional regression of y t on X ex- 
actly fits y t in sample. Then ̃  E t ( X g + e t+1 ) = y t so that 
p t = y t + y t and r t+1 = y t+1 − y t . The forecast mean 
squared error (MSE) is then var ( e t+1 − e t ) , i.e., twice the 
variance of the truly unpredictable e t+1 . 
For comparison, the naive “random walk” forecast that 
sets E t y t+1 = 0 would result in p t = y t and hence r t+1 = 
y t+1 . In this case, the forecast MSE is var ( X g + e t+1 ) . If 
a relatively small component of cash-flow growth is pre- 
dictable, that is, if var ( X g ) 	 var e t+1 , then the random 
walk forecast MSE may be substantially lower than the OLS 
forecast MSE. 
2.1. Priors and posteriors 
The problem with least-squares regression forecasts is 
that the prior implicit in the least-squares estimator is 
economically unreasonable. The posterior mean equals the 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator if investors’ prior 
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for g is diffuse. But a diffuse prior for g is not a plausible
assumption. Economic reasoning should lead investors to
realize that the amount of predictable variation in y t+1
must be limited. It does not make economic sense for in-
vestors to believe that arbitrarily large values for g are just
as likely as values that give rise to moderate predictable
variation in y t+1 . While they might not have very pre-
cise prior knowledge of g , it reasonable to assume that the
distribution representing investors’ prior beliefs about g is
concentrated around moderate values of g . 
We therefore make the following specification of prior
beliefs. 
Assumption 3 . Before seeing data, investors hold prior be-
liefs 
g ∼ N(0 , g ) . 
That prior beliefs are centered around zero means that
investors a priori do not know which characteristics pre-
dict cash-flow growth and by how much. But they know
that magnitudes of g elements cannot be too big. Economic
restrictions on g that restrict the likely magnitudes of g
elements will play an important role later on in our analy-
sis. 
Proposition 1 . After investors have observed dividend growth
in a single period, y 1 , their posterior distribution of g is
g | y 1 , X ∼ N( ̃ g1 , D 1 ) , where 
˜ g1 = D 1 d 1 , 
D −1 1 = −1 g + X ′ −1 e X , 
d 1 = X ′ −1 e y 1 . 
After observing data for t periods, the posterior mean is
˜ gt = D t d t and 
D −1 t = −1 g + t X ′ −1 e X , 
d t = t X ′ −1 e y t , 
where y t = 1 t 
∑ t 
s =1 y s . Therefore 




−1 g + X ′ −1 e X 
] −1 
X ′ −1 e y t . (2)
The posterior mean ˜ g1 takes the form of a Tikhonov-
regularized (i.e., ridge) regression estimator, where the in-
verse of D 1 is “stabilized” by adding 
−1 
g to X 
′ −1 e X . Thus
our Bayesian framework connects to a large literature in
machine learning in which Tikhonov regularization is used
to deal with high-dimensional prediction problems. For ex-
ample, see Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014) . 2 
We first simplify the setup by making 2 To interpret the posterior mean in terms of standard regression esti- 
mators, we can use the Woodbury identity to write 




X ′ −1 e X 
)−1 } −1 
˜ gGLS, 1 
˜ gGLS, 1 = 
(
X ′ −1 e X 
)−1 
X ′ −1 e y 1 . 
This shows that the posterior mean is a weighted average of the prior 
mean (zero) and the GLS regression estimator ˜ gGLS, 1 . 
5 Assumption 4 . 
e = I , 
g = θ
J 
I , θ > 0 . 
Our results go through for a general (nonsingular) co- 
variance matrix e , i.e., with a factor structure in residu- 
als, though at the cost of some extra notational complexity. 
By assuming e = I , we are making the learning problem 
easy for investors. With uncorrelated residuals, investors 
achieve a given posterior precision with a smaller J than 
if residuals were correlated. 
By assuming that g is proportional to the identity, we 
put all the predictor variables on an equal footing from the 
prior perspective; and it is essential that the variance of 
the elements of g should decline with J in order to con- 
sider sensible asymptotic limits. To see this, note that the 
covariance matrix of X g is X g X 
′ , so the cross-sectional 
average prior variance of the predictable component of 






X g X 
′ )
ii 






x 2 i j 
( A 1) = θ, (3) 
using Assumptions 1 and 4 . 
To understand (2) , it will be convenient to think in 
terms of the principal components of the data matrix X . 
Specifically, we form the eigendecomposition 
1 
N 
X ′ X = Q Q ′ . (4) 
Here  is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues λ j > 0 
of 1 N X 
′ X along its diagonal, and Q is an orthogonal ma- 
trix whose columns are the corresponding eigenvectors of 
1 
N X 
′ X . These columns are the principal components of X . 
(It is possible to eigendecompose X in this way because 
1 
N X 
′ X is symmetric and positive definite.) Lastly, the nor- 
malization tr X ′ X = N J ( Assumption 1 ) implies that the av- 











X ′ X = 1 , (5) 
using the fact that the sum of the eigenvalues of a matrix 
equals its trace. 
Combining Assumption 4 with Eq. (2) , we obtain 




I + X ′ X 
] −1 
X ′ y t = t ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ y t , (6) 
where 
t = Q 
(




Q ′ (7) 
is a symmetric matrix. The posterior mean ˜ gt shrinks the 
naive OLS estimate (from a regression of y t onto the 
columns of X ) along the principal components. Shrink- 
age is a consequence of the informative prior for g . The 
prior’s influence on the posterior is stronger if the ob- 
served data is less informative relative to the prior. To see 
explicitly what the degree of shrinkage depends on, note 
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3 See, for example, Anatolyev (2012) and Dobriban and Wa- 
ger (2018) for recent examples from the econometrics and statistics 
literature on high-dimensional regression that use this type of asymptotic 
analysis. This literature focuses on the asymptotic properties of esti- 
mators and statistical tests given an underlying data-generating model 
that stays fixed as N and J change. In contrast, in our case the nature of 
investors’ learning problem changes as N and J change, and hence the 
properties of the data that the econometrician analyzes change as well. 
4 Given our assumption that e = I , OLS and GLS coincide. The econo- 
metrician could also use shrinkage methods like ridge regression, effec- 
tively imposing a prior that the coefficients in the return predictability 
regression cannot be too big. To the extent that the implied prior distri- 
bution of the coefficients is roughly in line with the true distribution of 
the coefficients, using such methods would strengthen the in-sample re- 
turn predictability. We do not show formal results for this case, but we 
have explored the issue in simulations. that 
(




is diagonal with elements 
λ j 
λ j + J Nθt 
along its diagonal. Thus, shrinkage is strong if t or θ are
small, or J/N is large, or along principal components with
small eigenvalues. 
We are now in a position to characterize the behavior
of realized returns in equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 . With assets priced based on ˜ gt , realized returns
are 
r t+1 = y t+1 − p t = X ( I − t ) g − X t ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ ē t + e t+1 , 
(8)
where ē t = 1 t 
∑ t 
s =1 e s . Hence expected returns satisfy E r t+1 =
0 , and the covariance matrix satisfies 
E r t+1 r ′ t+1 = 
θ
J 
X ( I − t ) X ′ + I . 
Realized returns thus have three components. The first
term on the right-hand side of (8) reflects the effect of
“underreaction,” due to shrinkage, to the fundamental in-
formation in X . If investors had an uninformative prior
( θ → ∞ and hence t → I ) as in many conventional low-
dimensional Bayesian learning models, this term would not
be present. But as we have argued, such an uninformative
prior would imply that investors entertain an unreasonable
amount of predictable variation in dividend growth. Under
investors’ informed prior beliefs, this part is still zero in
expectation because the prior mean of g is zero; but for a
given draw of g that generates the data an econometrician
would study, it is not zero. 
The second term represents the effect of noise on in-
vestors’ posterior mean. To the extent that the unpre-
dictable shocks in ē t in a given sample line up, by chance,
with columns of X , this induces estimation error that tilts
investors’ cash flow–growth forecast away from X g . Shrink-
age via t reduces this component, at the cost of generat-
ing the first term. Under Bayesian learning, t optimally
trades off the pricing error arising from these two compo-
nents. 
The third term is the unpredictable shock e t+1 . In the
rational expectations case where g is known to investors,
the realized return would simply be equal to e t+1 and the
first two terms would not exist. 
In the Bayesian learning case, however, the first two
terms are not zero, and, as a consequence, returns con-
tain highly persistent components correlated with the
columns of X . Even though E r t+1 = 0 when we integrate
over the distribution of g under investors’ prior beliefs in
Proposition 2 , the expected returns are not zero condi-
tional on a given draw of g and ē t . Unconditionally, returns
are therefore more volatile, in the sense that E r t+1 r ′ t+1 − I
is positive definite (so that every asset and every portfo-
lio of assets have higher volatility than they would in the
rational expectations case in which, by Assumption 4 , the
covariance matrix equals I ). As we now show, the presence
of these components may induce certain forms of return
predictability. 6 3. Asymptotic analysis 
We now analyze the properties of asset prices in high- 
dimensional asymptotic analysis when N, J → ∞ , where 
J/N → ψ > 0 , where ψ is a fixed number. 3 This differs 
from the usual low-dimensional large N , fixed J (or large T , 
fixed N, and fixed J) asymptotics that underlie most econo- 
metric methods in asset pricing. The high-dimensional 
asymptotics are intended to provide a tractable approxima- 
tion for the case where J and N are finite and J is not small 
relative to N (just as conventional large N –fixed J asymp- 
totics provide an approximation for the small J/N case). 
3.1. In-sample predictability 
We consider an econometrician who studies these re- 
alized returns with the usual tools of frequentist statistics. 
The econometrician looks for return predictability by re- 
gressing r t+1 on the variables in X using OLS. 4 By allowing 
the econometrician to see all the predictor variables used 
by investors, we make things as easy as possible for the 
econometrician. In the Online Appendix, we modify our 
main results to allow the econometrician to see only a sub- 
set of the investors’ predictors, and show that this modifi- 
cation does not affect our main results in any substantive 
way. 
As the number of predictor variables increases, J → ∞ , 
we are potentially in the realm of Big Data. But the mere 
fact that empiricists have access to a lot of data is not 
enough, as some of the data could be (asymptotically) re- 
dundant. Our next assumption can therefore be thought of 
as formalizing the notion of a Big Data environment. 
Assumption 5 (Big Data). The eigenvalues λ j of 
1 
N X 
′ X sat- 
isfy λ j > ε for all j, where ε > 0 is a uniform constant as 
N → ∞ . 
To understand this assumption, note that if X ′ X has 
eigenvalues that are very close to zero, then the columns 
of X are roughly collinear. To find a linear combination 
v ∈ R J of columns of X with the property that X v is small 
(where v is a unit vector, v ′ v = 1 ), we can choose v to be 
a unit eigenvector of X ′ X with minimal eigenvalue λmin 
so that ( X v ) ′ ( X v ) = λmin ≈ 0 . Thus if there are eigenvalues 
close to zero, then some characteristics are approximately 
spanned by other characteristics. 
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We emphasize, however, that even if a small number of
principal components capture much of the variation in the
data, it does not necessarily follow that the Big Data as-
sumption is violated. In Section 3.2 , we will exhibit a nat-
ural benchmark case (namely, the case in which the char-
acteristics in X are drawn in an IID random way) in which
the assumption holds even though there are indeed a few
principal components that capture much of the variation
(and many more that contribute relatively little variation).
It is ultimately an empirical question whether we live in a
Big Data world in the sense of Assumption 5 . As we will
now show, the qualitative properties of standard econo-
metric tests are starkly different depending on whether or
not the assumption holds. 
The econometrician regresses r t+1 on X , obtaining a
vector of cross-sectional regression coefficients 
h t+1 = 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ r t+1 . (9)
In our baseline asymptotic analysis, we focus on the case
in which the econometrician uses all characteristics jointly
as return predictors. The online appendix shows that we
obtain similar results in the case where the econometrician
only observes a subset of the firm characteristics known
to investors. Our simulations in Section 4 below also con-
sider the case where many econometricians analyze single-
predictor regressions. 
Following the logic of rational expectations economet-
rics, which assumes that investors price assets under
knowledge of g , the econometrician entertains r t+1 = e t+1
as the no-predictability null hypothesis. Given that the el-
ements of e t+1 are distributed N(0 , 1) , it would follow, un-
der this null, that 5 
√ 
N h t+1 ∼ N 
(
0 , N( X ′ X ) −1 
)
. (10)
Hence, under the econometrician’s rational expectations
null hypothesis, we would have 
h 
′ 
t+1 ( X 
′ X ) h t+1 ∼ χ2 J . (11)
As we want to characterize the properties of the econo-
metrician’s test under asymptotics where N, J → ∞ and
J/N → ψ > 0 , it is more convenient to let the econometri-





′ X h t+1 − J √ 
2 J 
. (12)
Under the econometrician’s rational expectations null, we
would have, asymptotically, 
T re 
d −→ N ( 0 , 1 ) as N, J → ∞ , J/N → ψ > 0 . (13)
But the actual asymptotic distribution of T re is influ-
enced by the components of returns involving ē t and g
in (8) . These components alter the asymptotic distribution5 Recall that we assume e = I ( Assumption 4 ). More generally, if the 
econometrician has to estimate e , this can be done based on the re- 
gression residual ξt+1 = r t+1 − X h t+1 = 
[
I − X ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ 
]
e t+1 , used to es- 
timate the variance as ( X ′ X ) −1 1 
N−J ξ
′ 
t+1 ξt+1 , which would estimate the 
variance consistently under conventional large- N , fixed- J . However, if the 
econometrician does not impose the null hypothesis h t+1 = 0 in this vari- 
ance estimation, the estimated variance is an additional source of test size 
distortions; see Anatolyev (2012) for more details. 
7 and may lead the rejection probabilities of a test using 
N(0 , 1) critical values based on (13) , or χ2 critical values 
based on (11) , to differ from the nominal size of the test. 
Our first result characterizes the properties of this test 
statistic under the true model, according to which returns 
follow Eq. (8) . In this analysis, we assume that g is drawn 
from the prior distribution. This assumption is conservative 
in the sense that investors’ prior beliefs about the distribu- 
tion of g are objectively correct. If investors’ priors were 
to deviate from this distribution, this would be another 
source of return predictability. 
To assess the performance of the rational expectations 




X ′ X 
)−1 
and b = E 
(




for the covariance matrices of the predictive coefficient es- 
timates under the (incorrect) rational expectations null hy- 
pothesis and the true model, respectively. When returns 
are generated under the true model (8) , the rational expec- 
tations econometrician will use inappropriately small stan- 
dard errors, in the sense that b 
−1 
re − I is positive defi- 
nite. 6 
The first two moments of the eigenvalues of b 
−1 
re 
control the asymptotic behavior of T re . These eigenvalues 
( ζi,t ) can be written explicitly in terms of the eigenvalues 
( λ j ) of 
1 
N X 
′ X as 
ζi,t = 1 + 
1 
t + J 
Nθλi 
. (14) 
We write the limiting mean and variance of the eigenval- 
ues as 













ζ 2 i,t − μ2 . 
By the “Big Data” Assumption 5 , we have 1 < μ < 2 and 
1 < 
√ 
μ2 + σ 2 < 2 for all t ≥ 1 . (Without the assumption, 
we would have μ = 1 and σ = 0 if λi → 0 and hence ζi,t → 
1 .) 
Proposition 3 . If returns are generated according to (8) , then 




′ X h t+1 −
∑ J 






d −→ N(0 , 1) . 
It follows that the test statistic T re satisfies 
T re √ 
μ2 + σ 2 
− μ − 1 √ 
2 
(
μ2 + σ 2 
)√ J d −→ N(0 , 1) 
where 1 < μ < 2 and 1 < 
√ 
μ2 + σ 2 < 2 . 
We can therefore think of T re as a multiple of a standard 





μ2 + σ 2 N(0 , 1) + μ − 1 √ 
2 
√ 
J . (15) 6 As the proof of Proposition 3 shows, b 
−1 









Q ′ , where Q is orthogonal and  is diagonal with 
positive entries. It is therefore a symmetric matrix with positive eigen- 
values, and so is positive definite. 
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7 Then Assumption 1 holds asymptotically, as 1 
NJ 
tr X ′ X = 1 
NJ 
∑ 




1 as N, J → ∞ by the strong law of large numbers. (For comparison, the rational expectations econometri-
cian thinks T re is asymptotically standard Normal, as in
Eq. (13) .) Thus the rejection probability tends rapidly to
one as N and J tend to infinity. 
These results apply as J tends to infinity with t held
finite. If we also allow t to tend to infinity, then agents
learn the model and μ shrinks toward 1; in this case,
Eq. (15) shows that the key question is whether μ tends
to 1 faster than J tends to infinity. Under the Big Data
Assumption 5 , we have μ − 1 > 1 
t+ J 
Nθε 
, so the final term
in (15) will create problems for the econometrician if 
√ 
J
grows faster than t . Since one period in our analysis should
correspond to the time length of the return sample that
an econometrician might use in an asset-pricing test, the
length of one period should be at least a decade. There-
fore, t will typically be much smaller than 
√ 
J in cross-
sectional asset-pricing settings. An asymptotic analysis in
which 
√ 
J grows faster than t then likely provides a bet-
ter approximation for typical finite-sample properties than
one in which t grows faster. For this reason, we continue
to focus on the fixed- t case. 
Proposition 4 . In a test of return predictability based on the
rational expectations null (13) , we would have, for any critical
value c α and at any time t, 
P ( T re > c α) → 1 as N, J → ∞ , J/N → ψ. 
More precisely, for any fixed t > 0 , the probability that the
test fails to reject declines exponentially fast as N and J in-









μ2 + σ 2 
) , (16)
for any critical value c α . 
Thus, when J is not small relative to N, in-sample
predictability tests lose their economic meaning, in the
sense that the usual interpretation of in-sample return pre-
dictability evidence is not warranted. The typical conclu-
sion from rejections of the no-predictability null in studies
of the cross-section of stock returns is that models of risk
premia or mispricing due to imperfectly rational investors
are needed to explain the evidence. Our model points to a
third possibility: investors are Bayesian, but in-sample re-
turn predictability arises even for large t because investors’
forecasting problem is high-dimensional. 
Instead of testing for predictability by studying the size
of coefficients in predictive regressions via h ′ t+1 X ′ X h t+1 ,
as above, we might imagine trying to construct a trading
strategy with weights proportional to in-sample predicted
returns, 
w IS,t = 1 
N 
X h t+1 . 
As the predictive coefficients satisfy h t+1 = 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ r t+1 ,
the return on the strategy is 
r ′ t+1 w IS,t = 
1 
N 






′ X h t+1 . 
Thus the two approaches are equivalent. 8 3.2. A benchmark example: X a random matrix 
With some additional assumptions on the matrix of 
firm characteristics X , we can explicitly calculate the limit 
moments that appear in our propositions. We can then see, 
for example, how these limit moments depend on ψ , the 
limiting ratio of the number of predictors, J, to the number 
of observations, N. 
Suppose that characteristics are determined at random, 
so that X has IID entries x i j with mean zero, unit vari- 
ance, and finite fourth moment. 7 Nature generates this ma- 
trix once before investors start learning, and it stays fixed 
thereafter. As before, investors know X , and it stays fixed 
when we imagine an econometrician repeatedly sampling 
data by rerunning the economy. 
We can use results from random matrix theory to 
characterize the distribution of the eigenvalues λi . In 
particular, the eigenvalue distribution converges to the 
Marchenko-Pastur distribution as N, J → ∞ with J/N = ψ . 
For ψ close to one, this distribution features substan- 
tial probability mass on eigenvalues close to zero, indi- 
cating that many of the columns of X are close to being 
collinear. Nonetheless, the results of Yin et al. (1988) and 
Bai and Yin (1993) ensure that all the eigenvalues lie in 











for all j. Thus Assumption 5 is 
satisfied. 
Figure 1 shows histograms of the eigenvalue distribu- 
tions in examples with X drawn randomly with N(0 , 1) en- 
tries, setting N = 10 0 0 and J = 10 , 10 0, 50 0, and 90 0. Solid
red lines in the figures illustrate the limiting Marchenko- 
Pastur distribution for the eigenvalues λ j in each case; we 
also calculate the corresponding asymptotic distribution of 
the eigenvalues ζ j,t by change of variable, using Eq. (A.6) in 
the appendix. When ψ = J/N is close to one, there is con- 
siderable mass near zero, implying that there are many ap- 
proximately collinear relations between the columns of X . 
This is a realistic property that one would also find in ac- 
tual empirical data if one assembled a huge matrix of firm 
characteristics. 
Our next result characterizes the limiting cross- 
sectional mean, μ, and variance, σ 2 , of the distribution of 
the eigenvalues ζ j,t . 
Proposition 5 . The cross-sectional moments of ζ j,t satisfy 
μ = 1 + ψ + θt(ψ + 1) −
√ 
[ ψ + θt(ψ + 1) ] 2 − 4 θ2 t 2 ψ 
2 θt 2 ψ 
(17) 
and 
σ 2 = θ
2 t 2 ψ − ( θt + ψ ) 2 




θ2 t 2 ( ψ − 2 ) − θtψ + ψ 2 
)
+ ( θt + ψ ) 3 
2 θ2 t 4 ψ 2 
√ 
[ ψ + θt ( ψ + 1 ) ] 2 − 4 θ2 t 2 ψ 
. (18) 
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Fig. 1. Histograms of eigenvalue distributions in examples with θ = 1 , t = 1 , N = 10 0 0 and J = 50 , 50 0 , 90 0 . The asymptotic distribution is shown as a solid 












This result allows explicit calculation of the limit mo-
ments that appear in Propositions 3 and 4 . For example,
Proposition 4 shows that the probability of rejecting the
null of no predictability declines exponentially fast as N
increases, and derives the rate of the exponential decay.
Proposition 5 can be used to derive an exact analytical ex-
pression for the rate in terms of the model primitives θ ,
ψ , and t . 
Figure 2 shows how the rate function (16) depends on
ψ for θ = 1 and t = 1 . For ψ > 0 . 4 , the rate is higher than
0.015, indicating that the probability of not rejecting the
null is on the order of exp (−0 . 015 N) , which is a tiny num-
ber even for relatively small cross-sections of, say, N ≥ 300 .9 3.3. (Absence of) out-of-sample return predictability 
The situation looks very different with regard to out-of- 
sample predictability. We now consider a trading strategy 
that holds stocks in period t + 1 with weights proportional 
to predicted returns based on regression coefficients h s +1 , 
r OOS,t+1 = w ′ OOS,s +1 r t+1 , w OOS,s +1 = 
1 
N 
X h s +1 (19) 
where s  = t such that the trading strategy is out-of-sample 
in the sense that the returns used to obtain the coefficient 
estimates h s +1 do not overlap with the returns r t+1 used 
in the evaluation of this strategy. 
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In the forward out-of-sample case s < t , r OOS,t+1 is the
return on a trading strategy that would be implementable
at the end of period s + 1 based on the econometrician’s
regression coefficients at that time. We also analyze the
backward out-of-sample case where s > t . In this case,
r OOS,t+1 does not represent the return on a tradable strat-
egy, but it is still interesting for econometric evaluation
of cross-sectional return predictability where researchers
sometimes do go back in time and evaluate trading strate-
gies on new, previously unavailable historical data from
earlier time periods. 
We obtain the following result for the asymptotic dis-
tribution of r OOS,t+1 : 
Proposition 6 . If returns are generated according to (8) and
r OOS,t+1 is calculated as in (19) with s  = t, then 
E r OOS,t+1 = 0 , 
and, in the large N, J limit, 
r OOS,t+1 √ ∑ J 
i =1 ζi,s ζi,t 
d −→ N(0 , 1) . 
In the forward prediction case t > s , using last period’s
estimated coefficients to form the portfolio, this is a nat-
ural result. Investors are Bayesian, so the econometrician
cannot “beat” investors in predicting returns as long as the
econometrician is put on the same footing as investors in
terms of the data that are available at the time of mak-
ing the prediction. Hence, the expected value of r OOS ,t+1 is
zero. 
That the result also applies backwards in time, with t <
s , is more surprising. The result suggests that the econo-
metrician could conduct backwards out-of-sample tests.
The fact that many cross-sectional asset-pricing anoma-
lies do not hold up in backwards out-of-sample tests
( Linnainmaa and Roberts, 2018 ) could therefore be a con-
sequence of investor learning, even without data-snooping
on the part of researchers who published the original
anomaly studies. 
While the forward result is likely a general property of
Bayesian learning (with objectively correct prior), the back-
wards result might be somewhat specific to the environ-
ment we have set up here (e.g., the assumption that cash-
flow growth is IID over time). To what extent one can gen-
eralize the backwards result is an interesting question for
future research. 
The absence of backwards out-of-sample predictability
is also interesting because it suggests that the common10 practice of using cross-validation for evaluating prediction 
models is justified in an environment like ours where in- 
vestors face a learning problem. Many recent papers in 
the emerging machine learning literature in empirical asset 
pricing use cross-validation (e.g., Feng et al., 2020; Kozak 
et al., 2020; Bryzgalova et al., 2019 ). In cross-validation, 
the data is partitioned repeatedly into estimation and val- 
idation samples. For example, several blocks of calendar 
years are used for model estimation, and other blocks are 
held for out-of-sample model validation. Then the blocks 
are switched and the procedure is repeated multiple times. 
The time ordering of blocks does not matter in this pro- 
cedure. Some validation blocks can therefore temporally 
precede some of the estimation blocks. This brings up 
the concern that cross-validation could pick up learning- 
induced in-sample predictability. Our backwards result in 
Proposition 6 suggests that this is not the case. Backwards 
prediction, forward prediction, and combinations of the 
two (as in cross-validation) are equivalent. Further below, 
we explore whether cross-validation approaches could also 
be useful in assessing the magnitude of out-of-sample pre- 
dictable cross-sectional variation in returns. 
While the result in Proposition 6 that out-of-sample 
trading strategies with weights based on return fore- 
casts have zero expected returns is straightforward, em- 
pirical testing of this prediction is not. The econome- 
trician could try to empirically approximate the asymp- 
totic standard deviation in the denominator of the ratio in 
Proposition 6 from the time-series standard deviation of 
the r OOS observations. As we suggested earlier, one could 
think of one period in this model as roughly a decade and 
could imagine the econometrician observing intra-period 
r OOS realizations that are sampled at higher frequency. 
Would a simple t-test that compares the estimated mean 
of intraperiod returns to the standard error calculated from 
intraperiod returns provide a valid test of the E r OOS,t+1 = 0 
hypothesis? 
Unfortunately, the answer is no. The reason is that the 
expectation in E r OOS,t+1 = 0 is unconditional in the sense 
that it integrates over the distribution of g . However, the 
econometrician only observes one sample for a given draw 
of g . Nature draws g before any data are generated, and 
the econometrician cannot rerun history for a different 
value of g . Moreover, if the econometrician starts sampling 
the out-of-sample strategy returns at the beginning of pe- 
riod t + 1 , the sample is also conditioned on the path of 
e 1 , . . . , e t . 
In this one sample available to the econometrician, the 
distribution of r OOS,t+1 has mean E 
[
r OOS,t+1 | g , e 1 , . . . , e t 
]
, 
which is generally not zero. In the same way, a sam- 
ple variance of r OOS,t+1 in this one sample would esti- 
mate var (r OOS,t+1 | g , e 1 , . . . , e t ) , not the unconditional vari- 
ance under the square root in the denominator of the ex- 
pression in Proposition 6 . As a consequence, a t-statistic 
based on this sample mean and variance would not yield 
a correctly sized test of the Bayesian learning null hypoth- 
esis. 
Heuristically, at least, there is a relatively simple solu- 
tion. Since E r OOS,t+1 = 0 , we have var (r OOS,t+1 ) = E r 2 OOS,t+1 . 
Moreover, E r 2 OOS,t+1 = EE [ r 2 OOS,t+1 | g , e 1 , . . . , e t ] and so 
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var (r OOS,t+1 ) = EE [ r 2 OOS,t+1 | g , e 1 , . . . , e t ] . Therefore, if the
econometrician uses the mean of squared intraperiod
returns rather than the sample variance of returns as
an estimate of var (r OOS,t+1 ) , this estimate is on average,
across samples with different g and e 1 , . . . , e t , equal to
the unconditional variance. The reason is that the mean
of squared returns captures the deviations of r OOS,t+1 from
zero due to E 
[
r OOS,t+1 | g , e 1 , . . . , e t 
]
 = 0 , while in a sam-
ple variance calculation these components are removed
through demeaning. 
3.4. Out-of-sample moment conditions for risk premia 
estimation 
In our model so far, we have abstracted from risk pre-
mia or the possibility that investors’ subjective beliefs may
deviate from the prescriptions of Bayesian updating with
objectively correct priors. Risk premia or belief distortions
would induce additional predictable components in asset
returns beyond those that we have (8) . And an empiricist
may want to estimate to what extent characteristics X are
associated with risk premia or belief distortions, while al-
lowing, at the same time, for the possibility that investors
may be learning about the predictive role of X for asset
cash flows. 
Suppose the characteristics are associated with a pre-
dictable component X γ for some vector γ that represents
risk premia (for brevity, we use the label “risk premia”
from now on, but with the understanding that nonzero el-
ements in γ could arise from belief distortions or frictions,
too). In this case, adding this component to the returns in
(8) , we get 
r t+1 = X γ + X ( I − t ) g − X t ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ ē t + e t+1 . (20)
How can the econometrician estimate the risk premium
component X γ? Under RE, with the second and third term
on the right-hand side of (20) absent, the econometrician
could just regress r t+1 on X in an in-sample regression
and estimate X γ with the fitted value from this regres-
sion. But when investors are learning about g , this does
not work because the second and third terms are not zero
and are correlated with X . An OLS regression of r t+1 on X 
would be distorted by the presence of these terms. Along
the same lines as in tests of the no-predictability null that
we analyzed earlier, in-sample tests of hypotheses about
γ would be distorted by the presence of the learning-
induced components in returns. 
We can solve this problem by focusing on the out-of-
sample return r OOS,t+1 . Given the returns (20) and using




γ ′ X ′ X γ = E r OOS,t+1 . (21)
Therefore, the econometrician could estimate 1 N γ
′ X ′ X γ by
the sample analog of the expectation on the right-hand
side. This does not identify the risk premia associated with
individual characteristics, but it allows the econometrician
to estimate the overall contribution of risk premia to re-
turn predictability. 
Of course, statistical inference in this case runs into
the same problem that we discussed for the out-of-sample11 test in the previous subsection. Analogous to our earlier 
discussion, the econometrician could use squared intrape- 
riod realizations of r OOS,t+1 to estimate var (r OOS,t+1 ) . In this 
case, with risk premia components in returns, the squared 
returns would also incorporate the squared risk premia. 
As a consequence, E r 2 
OOS,t+1 > var (r OOS,t+1 ) . Standard errors 
based on these estimates of var (r OOS,t+1 ) may therefore be 
somewhat conservative in the sense that they overstate the 
sampling variation on average. 
3.5. Comparison with cross-validated penalized regression 
Since the above estimation procedure amounts to look- 
ing for return components that are predictable out-of- 
sample, one may wonder whether penalized regression 
with penalty choice based on cross-validation could be an 
alternative route towards a suitable estimator of quantities 
like 1 N γ
′ X ′ X γ that provide an assessment of the magnitude 
of risk premia. As we show now, there is indeed a close 
connection between the estimator based on a sample ana- 
log of (21) and penalized regression with penalty choice 
based on cross-validation. 
Consider the penalized criterion for an in-sample re- 
gression in period t , 
b t = arg min 
b t 
[
( r t − X b t ) ′ ( r t − X b t ) + ξb ′ t X ′ X b t 
]
(22) 
for a given penalty parameter ξ . This second term in this 
criterion penalizes parameter estimates b t that imply a 
large in-sample predictable component of returns, b ′ t X ′ X b t , 
or, equivalently, a high return of the in-sample portfo- 
lio that invests with weights proportional to X b t . This 
penalty specification is closely related to the approach in 
Kozak et al. (2020) that estimates stochastic discount fac- 
tors with a maximum squared Sharpe ratio penalty. It is 
also similar to ridge regression, but with the difference 
that standard ridge regression would penalize simply the 
sum of squared coefficients b ′ t b t . 
The solution to the problem (22) is 
b t = 1 
1 + ξ h t , (23) 
or, in other words, simply the OLS regression coefficients 
shrunk towards zero by a scalar factor that depends on 
the penalty parameter ξ . Cross-validation then seeks the ξ
that minimizes the out-of-sample residual sum of squares, 
namely, 




r t+1 − 1 
1 + ξ X h s +1 
} ′ 
{ 
r t+1 − 1 
1 + ξ X h s +1 
} ] 
. (24) 
Given the optimal ξ , we can then calculate a cross- 
validated portfolio return with weights based on the 
shrunk coefficients 1 
1+ ξ ∗ h s +1 : 
r CV,s +1 = w ′ CV,s +1 r s +1 , w CV,s +1 = 
1 
1 + ξ ∗ X h s +1 . (25) 
This is an in-sample portfolio return where period s + 1 
returns are weighted based on regression coefficients es- 
timated from the same returns, but with shrinkage toward 
zero induced by 1 
1+ ξ ∗ . 
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8 For this analysis, they do not report percentiles at sufficient detail to 
calculate the interdecile spread, but they report means for quintile bins, 
and the spread between top and bottom quintile bin mean should corre- 
spond approximately to the interdecile range. Taking the first-order condition of problem (24) , and
comparing with the definition of r CV in (25) and r OOS in
(19) , one can see that it implies 
E r CV,s +1 = E r OOS,s +1 . (26)
Hence, even though r CV,s +1 is an in-sample portfolio re-
turn, the cross-validated ξ exerts the right amount of
shrinkage to remove the learning-induced in-sample pre-
dictable variation in returns and isolate γ ′ X ′ X γ , just as
the out-of-sample portfolio return r OOS,t+1 does according
to (21) . 
Since penalization can be interpreted as shrinkage in-
duced by informative prior beliefs, we can interpret this
result as showing that the econometrician can use cross-
validation to empirically back out prior beliefs that remove
the tendency of in-sample regressions to overstate how
much return predictability there really is out-of-sample.
Within our Bayesian learning setting, this result therefore
provides an economic interpretation of approaches that
use cross-validation ( Kozak et al., 2020 ) or related meth-
ods ( Chinco et al., 2021 ) to estimate prior beliefs for cross-
sectional return prediction. 
In our empirical application below, we compare r OOS
with a slightly simplified version of r CV that is based on
a standard ridge regression, i.e., with penalty proportional
to b ′ t b t instead of b ′ t X ′ X b t . 
4. Finite-sample analysis: simulations 
In this section, we report the results of finite-sample
simulations. These simulations provide some insight on the
extent to which the asymptotic results provide a good ap-
proximation in a setting with realistic J and N. We set
N = 10 0 0 and let J vary from 1 to close to 10 0 0. We draw
the elements of X from a standard Normal distribution. 
For the purpose of this numerical analysis, we also need
to set the parameter θ that pins down the share of pre-
dictable variation in cash-flow growth through g = θJ I .
What matters here is not the total level of cash-flow vari-
ance but rather the share that is predictable. For this rea-
son, we normalize, as before, e = I . We then look for a
value of θ that yields a plausible amount of predictable
variation in cash-flow growth relative to this normalized
residual variance. 
Based on our data-generating process for cash-flow
growth in (1) , annualized growth rates over a horizon of










e t . 
We now evaluate the share that is predictable, given
knowledge of g . This is an upper bound on the share that
investors learning about g may be able to predict. The an-
nualized variance of the predictable component (first term
on the right-hand side) is constant with respect to T , while
the variance of the residual component (second term on
the right-hand side) shrinks at the rate 1 /T . As we indi-
cated earlier, we think of one period in the model as rep-
resenting roughly one decade. In this case, at a horizon















so the ratio of forecastable to residual variance also equals 
θ . 
We can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to com- 
pare this to the growth rate evidence for various revenue 
and profit measures in Chan et al. (2003) . When stocks are 
sorted based on IBES analysts’ forecasts (their Table IX), 
Chan et al. find an interdecile spread of slightly around ten 
percentage points (pp) for annualized growth rates over 
the next one, three, and five years. Extrapolating to ten 
years, we would have ten pp also at a ten-year horizon. 8 
When they sort stocks instead based on their ex post real- 
ized annualized growth rates over a one-year horizon, they 
find an interdecile range of around 50 pp. Assuming nor- 
mal distributions, these estimates imply a ratio of about 
0.04 of forecastable to residual variance at a one-year hori- 
zon. An IID data-generating process for cash flows, as in 
our model, would imply that the residual variance shrinks 
at rate 1 /T and hence the ratio of forecastable to residual 
variance at a ten-year horizon is 0.4. This share of fore- 
castable variance represents a lower bound, as analysts can 
predict only a less than full share of the total potentially 
predictable variance. For this reason, it seems reasonable 
to set the ratio of maximally predictable to residual vari- 
ance somewhat higher than 0.4 in our simulations. Accord- 
ingly, we set θ = 1 . 
4.1. Return prediction with many predictors 
We now simulate cash flows and, based on investors’ 
Bayesian updating and pricing, the returns on the N = 
10 0 0 assets. We then consider an econometrician who 
samples these returns ex post and runs regressions of r T +1 
on X after investors have learned about g for T peri- 
ods. Figure 3 a presents the (in-sample) adjusted R 2 from 
these regressions. As J increases towards N, the adjusted 
R 2 also increases; hence, returns become more predictable 
in-sample. If investors have learned for more periods, re- 
turn predicability gets weaker. 
Figure 3 b looks at the properties of a standard 
Wald test of the no-predictability null hypothesis, testing 
whether the coefficients on the J predictor variables are 
jointly equal to zero. The plot shows the rejection prob- 
abilities (actual size) from a χ2 –test based on the null 
distribution in (10) . The dotted line shows the nominal 
size of 5% that the test would have, asymptotically, if in- 
vestors priced assets under rational expectations with per- 
fect knowledge of g . The figure shows that the actual re- 
jection probabilities can be far higher than 5% . The rejec- 
tion probabilities go to one as J grows towards N. The in- 
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Fig. 3. In-sample return predictability tests. Based on cross-sectional regressions with N = 10 0 0 assets and J predictor variables, predicting the last return 
in a sample of size T + 1 and where investors have learned about g from a sample of size T . The test in panel (b) is a joint χ 2 –test using all J predictors. 
It has an asymptotic 5% rejection probability under the rational expectations null hypothesis (where investors know g ). The solid lines show the actual 






crease is slower if investors have learned for more peri-
ods, but even with T = 4 , the rejection probability exceeds
90% when J > N/ 2 . Thus, the simulations confirm that the
asymptotic result of rejection probabilities going to one is,
indeed, a good approximation for the large J/N case with
finite N and J. 13 4.2. Return prediction with single predictors and multiple 
testing 
In our analysis so far, we assumed that the econome- 
trician runs a kitchen-sink regression using all variables in 
X as predictors. This may seem unrealistic, as individual 
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Fig. 4. In-sample return predictability tests with single predictors and correction for multiple testing. Based on J cross-sectional regression with N = 10 0 0 
assets and one out of J predictor variables in each regression, predicting the last return in a sample of size T + 1 , and where investors have learned about 
g from a sample of size T = 4 . Critical values are adjusted so that the probability that k of the J hypotheses are rejected would be 5% in the rational 
expectations case (where investors know g ). The solid lines show the actual rejection probabilities when this test is applied in a setting where Bayesian 



























empirical studies often use individual predictors or small
subsets of the universe of predictors observable to the
econometrician. Researchers collectively examined a large
number of predictors, but not necessarily a large number
jointly in individual studies. However, as we show now, the
finding of excessive rejection of the no-predictability null
is not exclusive to the kitchen-sink setup. Similar conclu-
sions emerge if we consider the possibility that a collection
of individual researchers each examine single predictors. 
We now imagine that J econometricians, indexed by
j = 1 , 2 , . . . , J, run regressions of r t+1 on a single charac-
teristic x j (i.e., column j of X ) and each of them tests the
hypothesis H j that x j does not predict returns. How many
of them will reject the no-predictability null? Does high
dimensionality of investors’ learning problem lead to more
rejections? 
To obtain an interpretable benchmark, we apply a mul-
tiple testing adjustment in which we adjust critical values
using the approach of Guo and Romano (2007) such that
we control the k -familywise error rate ( k -FWER). Specifi-
cally, we adjust critical values such that the probability of
rejection of at least k of these J hypotheses would be equal
to 5%, i.e., 
k -FWER = P ( reject at least k hypotheses H j ) = 0 . 05 
if asset prices were generated under rational expectations.
We then look at actual probability of rejection of at least k
hypotheses when asset prices are generated under investor
learning. 
Figure 4 presents the results for several different val-
ues of k and T = 4 . As in the kitchen-sink regression case,
we see a general increase in rejection probabilities rela-14 tive to the RE benchmark value of 5% when J gets big- 
ger relative to N. For example, with k = 20 and J/N = 0 . 05 , 
the actual rejection probability is 25%, compared with a 
k -FWER–controlled rejection probability of 5% under RE. 
With J/N close to unity, the actual rejection probability 
rises to 80%, while it is still 5% under RE. Therefore, simi- 
lar to the kitchen-sink regression case, high dimensionality 
leads to likely rejections of the no-predictability null, even 
if econometricians correctly use a multiple-testing adjust- 
ment to evaluate their joint evidence from the J individual 
tests. 
5. Sparsity 
So far we have assumed a setting in which shrinkage of 
coefficients towards zero is the optimal way for investors 
to deal with the large number of cash-flow predictors. But 
investors do not impose sparsity (i.e., some coefficients 
of exactly zero) on the forecasting model. The absence of 
sparsity was a consequence of the normal prior distribu- 
tion of g . If, instead, investors’ prior is that the elements of 
g are drawn from a Laplace distribution and investors price 
assets based on the mode rather than the mean of the 
posterior distribution (i.e., a maximum-a-posteriori estima- 
tor), then asset prices reflect sparse cash flow forecasts in 
which some columns of X are multiplied with coefficients 
of zero. Their forecasts can then be represented as the fit- 
ted values from a Lasso regression ( Tibshirani, 1996 ). 
That investors use the posterior mode in pricing is a de- 
viation from the fully Bayesian framework. Our simulations 
will shed light on how much of a deviation this is in terms 
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9 Note that this would not mean that investors were irrational. Rational 
Bayesian reasoning does not require that prior beliefs be consistent with 
the true distribution of g , which would be unknown to investors. Exis- 
tence of out-of-sample return predictability evidence would be consistent 
not only with the bounded rationality explanation of excess shrinkage or 
sparsity, but also with a tight-prior explanation. Changes over time in 
out-of-sample predictability might allow us to disentangle the two. of how much additional return predictability results from
it. 
With a Laplace prior, elements g j are IID with the dis-
tribution 









The variance is 2 b 2 . To keep the variance the same as in
the normal prior case, we set 2 b 2 = θJ . This Laplace dis-
tribution not only represents investors’ prior, but we now
also draw the elements of g in our simulations from this
distribution. So the prior is again objectively correct, as in
the normal prior case we considered earlier. 
Figure 5 shows that the results in the Laplace prior
case are extremely similar to those in Fig. 3 for the nor-
mal prior case. In terms of how in-sample predictability
strengthens with increasing J/N, it does not make much
difference whether investors shrink prediction model co-
efficients with or without sparsity. For the sake of brevity,
most of our results in the paper therefore focus on the nor-
mal prior case. 
6. Excess shrinkage or sparsity 
In our analysis up to this point, shrinkage or sparsity
was purely due to prior knowledge reflected in investors’
prior beliefs. Aside from such statistical optimality con-
siderations, there could be other reasons for investors to
shrink coefficients and impose sparsity on their forecast-
ing models. For example, if variables are costly to observe,
investors might prefer to discard a variable if it only of-
fers a weak signal about cash flows. Relative to the fric-
tionless Bayesian benchmark with objectively correct prior,
such a model would be excessively sparse, but the reduc-
tion in forecast performance may be justified by the cost
savings from model sparsity. Relatedly, Sims (2003) and
Gabaix (2014) show that shrinkage or sparsity can be used
to represent boundedly rational decision-making if atten-
tion to a variable generates an actual or psychological cost
(that shrinkage or sparsity helps avoid). 
Such variants of the model with excessive shrinkage
can still be mapped into a Bayesian updating scheme, but
the prior beliefs are concentrated more tightly around zero
than in the case with objectively correct prior (where the
prior distribution agrees with distribution that we draw
g from in generating the data). For this reason, we label
the benchmark case with objectively correct prior as DGP-
consistent shrinkage or sparsity. 
Figure 6 shows the consequences of excessive shrink-
age or sparsity for out-of-sample return predictability. In
all cases shown in the figure, the cash-flow data are gen-
erated, as before, with θ = 1 . However, investors’ prior be-
liefs are now based on a different value of θ . In the ex-
cessive shrinkage and sparsity cases, we let investors form
beliefs based on θ = 0 . 5 , which means that they have a
prior distribution for the elements of g that is more tightly
concentrated around zero than the actual distribution of g
that generates the data. For comparison, we also consider a
case where shrinkage is insufficient. In this case, investors
assume θ = 2 . This can be interpreted as investors having15 a lack of confidence, and, hence, excessively wide disper- 
sion, in their prior beliefs about g . In all cases, we show 
results for T = 4 , which means that investors have learned 
for four periods up to the beginning of the period in which 
we measure the return on the out-of-sample portfolio. 
The figure shows the out-of-sample return of a portfolio 
that weights assets by their predicted expected return as in 
(19) . Panel (a) shows the results in the normal prior/ridge 
regression case. As expected from Proposition 6 , the av- 
erage out-of-sample return in the DGP-consistent case is 
zero. In contrast, when shrinkage is excessive, investors 
end up downweighting too strongly the information in X 
that predicts cash flows. As a result, an econometrician 
sampling returns from this economy is able to forecast 
returns out-of-sample. And the effect gets stronger with 
higher J. Forming a portfolio that weights assets based on 
their estimated expected returns from predictive regres- 
sions on data up to time T earns a predictably positive re- 
turn in period T + 1 . 
Insufficient shrinkage also results in an out-of-sample 
average return that differs from zero, but the sign is neg- 
ative. This means that assets that would be predicted to 
have positive expected returns, based on the econome- 
trician’s predictive regression estimates from data up to 
time T , actually end up having negative returns in T + 1 
and vice versa. With insufficient shrinkage, the component 
−X t 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ ē t in the expression for r t+1 in (8) plays a 
bigger role than under DGP-consistent shrinkage. As a con- 
sequence, its negative covariance with the estimation error 
component X 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ e t of the fitted value X h t from the 
predictive regression in (9) dominates, which means the 
forecasts based on X h t tend to have the wrong sign out- 
of-sample. 
As panel (b) shows, the results in the Laplace 
prior/lasso regression case are similar. One difference 
is that the average out-of-sample return in the DGP- 
consistent case is somewhat negative instead of zero. This 
is a consequence of the assumption that investors in this 
case use the mode of the posterior distribution of g (which 
induces sparsity) to price assets rather than the posterior 
mean (which would imply a forecasting model that is not 
sparse). 
The takeaway from all this is that out-of-sample return 
predictability evidence can help shed light on whether in- 
vestors apply excessive shrinkage or sparsity in their cash 
flow–forecasting models. For example, if actual or psycho- 
logical costs of complex models induce additional sparsity, 
this should show up in the data as out-of-sample pre- 
dictable returns. Similarly, if investors’ prior distribution of 
g assumed a distribution of coefficients that was too tightly 
concentrated around zero compared with the true distribu- 
tion that generated the data, this would show up as out-of- 
sample predictability. 9 
I.W.R. Martin and S. Nagel Journal of Financial Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: FINEC [m3Gdc; November 27, 2021;13:29 ] 
Fig. 5. Lasso: in-sample return predictability tests. Based on cross-sectional regressions with N = 10 0 0 assets and J predictor variables, predicting the last 
return in a sample of size T + 1 and where investors have learned about g from a sample of size T . The test in panel (b) is a joint χ 2 –test using all J
predictors. It has an asymptotic 5% rejection probability under the rational expectations null hypothesis (where investors know g ). The solid lines show the 







This analysis also provides a perspective on the likely
effects of technological progress in data construction and
data analysis on the return predictability that is observed
in empirical analyses. Many studies of the cross-section of
stock returns use data that go back to time periods when
data availability and analysis were much more constrained16 than they are today. A researcher today can construct many 
variables (say, through automated textual analysis of cor- 
porate filings) that were inaccessible to investors until not 
very long ago. In this sense, the forecasting models that in- 
vestors used when they priced stocks several decades ago 
may have been excessively sparse relative to the model 
I.W.R. Martin and S. Nagel Journal of Financial Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: FINEC [m3Gdc; November 27, 2021;13:29 ] 
Fig. 6. Out-of-sample portfolio returns when investors apply excess shrinkage or sparsity. Based on cross-sectional regressions with N = 10 0 0 assets and J
predictor variables, predicting the last return in a sample of size T + 1 , and where investors have learned about g from sample of size T = 4 . Cash-flow data 
are always generated with θ = 1 . In the DGP-consistent prior case, investors’ prior is based on θ = 1 . In the excess shrinkage (or sparsity) case, investors’ 








that an empirical researcher could work with today. It is
to be expected, therefore, that a researcher today can con-
struct variables, or use combinations of large numbers of
variables, that predict returns in the earlier years of stock
return data sets, even in (pseudo-) out-of-sample tests in
which the researcher reconstructs investors’ learning pro-
cess, without taking into account the additional model
complexity constraints that investors faced in real time. 17 7. Empirical application: predicting stock returns with 
past returns 
To illustrate how our model provides an interpreta- 
tion of discrepancies between in-sample and out-of-sample 
stock return predictability, we look at an empirical applica- 
tion. The key prediction is that investor learning in a high- 
dimensional setting should lead to a substantial wedge 
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10 We compute the estimates using all but one year of the sample, we 
calculate the implied predicted returns in the year left out of the estima- 
tion, and we record the resulting R 2 in the left-out year. We then repeat 
with a different left-out year, again record the R 2 in the left-out years, and 
repeat until each year of the sample has been left out once. At the end, 
we average the R 2 across all left-out years, and we search for a penalty 
value that maximizes this cross-validated R 2 . between in-sample and out-of-sample predictability. The
contribution of risk premia, or mispricing induced by be-
havioral biases or frictions, to cross-sectional variation in
expected returns is revealed by out-of-sample portfolio re-
turns, not in-sample estimates. 
For this exercise, we seek a large set of predictor vari-
ables that were, at least in principle, consistently available
to investors over a long period of time. Many predictors
that are based on accounting variables do not satisfy this
criterion because they became available in Compustat data
only in later decades. Furthermore, to stay close to our
setting in the model where the econometrician studies a
given set of predictor variables only once, without speci-
fication searching and multiple testing, we do not want a
set of predictors that may already be the product of data
mining efforts by earlier researchers. For example, the set
of published predictors in the academic literature likely in-
cludes some that have been data mined ex post. To ad-
dress both concerns, we use each stock’s full price history
to generate our predictor variables. More precisely, we use
the monthly returns and monthly squared returns in the
past 120 months as predictors for the next month’s stock
return. Including squared returns allows the relation be-
tween past returns and future returns to be nonlinear. 
This price history was, at least in principle, available to
investors even in the early parts of the sample. This elim-
inates the possibility that return predictability could show
up ex post simply because a variable that we can construct
today was not available to investors in real time when they
priced stocks. Of course, the fact that the price history was
available in principle does not necessarily mean that in-
vestors throughout the sample always had the ability to
integrate all of these variables into their forecasting mod-
els. If they could not, we might find out-of-sample return
predictability in parts of the sample where technological
constraints may have prevented investors from doing so,
which would be consistent with our excess shrinkage re-
sults in the previous section. 
Focusing on price history–based predictors, without
preselecting particular subsets of them based on earlier
evidence of predictability, allows us to sidestep, for the
most part, the influence of earlier researchers’ data mining.
The only potential remaining problem is that our choice
of considering price history–based predictors as a class
could be influenced by existing evidence that subsets of
these seem to have predictive power (e.g., momentum,
long-run reversal). On the other hand, the class of price
history–based predictors would surely be a natural candi-
date even in absence of any existing evidence, given that
weak-form efficiency is the most basic market efficiency
notion ( Fama, 1970 ). 
A drawback of price history–based predictors is that
they do not perfectly map into our model. In our theo-
retical analysis, we worked with an exogenous cash-flow
predictor matrix X . In contrast, past returns are an equi-
librium outcome. One could, however, imagine an exten-
sion of the model in which cash flow–growth shocks could
have persistent components at various lags. In this case, in-
vestors’ set of potential cash-flow predictors would include
the history of past cash flow–growth shocks and lagged re-
turns would be correlated with these. In this sense, the18 distance from our model is not that big. In any case, the 
purpose of the empirical analysis is not to provide a for- 
mal test of the model but rather to illustrate, in a simple 
setting with a large number of predictors, the wedge be- 
tween in-sample and out-of-sample predictability. 
We use all U.S. stocks in the CRSP database except 
small stocks that have market capitalization below the 
20th NYSE percentile or a price lower than one dollar at 
the end of month t − 1 . To avoid picking up microstruc- 
ture related issues, we skip the most recent month in our 
construction of the set of predictor variables. Thus, we 
use simple and squared returns in months t − 2 to t − 120 
(i.e., a total of 238 predictor variables) to predict returns 
in month t in a panel regression. We demean the de- 
pendent variable and all explanatory variables month by 
month to focus purely on cross-sectional variation. In ad- 
dition, we cross-sectionally standardize all predictor vari- 
ables to unit standard deviation each month. We weight 
the observations each month such that the panel regres- 
sion gives equal weight to each month in the sample. 
As a first step, to demonstrate that a regression with 
shrinkage delivers meaningful estimates with such a large 
number of predictor variables, we examine an in-sample 
panel ridge regression to predict monthly returns from the 
beginning of 1971 until end of June 2019. We show that 
the ridge regression automatically recovers many promi- 
nent predictability patterns that have been documented in 
the existing literature for roughly this sample period or 
parts of it. We pick the penalty hyperparameter that de- 
termines the strength of shrinkage through leave-one-year- 
out cross-validation. 10 
Panel (a) in Fig. 7 presents the regression coefficients 
for each of the 119 simple return explanatory variables. It 
shows that a single ridge regression recovers several ma- 
jor anomalies related to past returns: the positive coeffi- 
cients up to lags of 12 months capture momentum as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ; the plot also shows that con- 
tinuation of recent returns is concentrated in lags seven 
to 12, as pointed out in Novy-Marx (2012) ; the mostly 
negative coefficients for lags beyond 12 months reflect 
long-term reversals as in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) ; the 
positive coefficients at lags equal to multiples of 12 re- 
flect the momentum seasonality reported by Heston and 
Sadka (2008) . Panel (b) reports the regression coefficients 
for the 119 lagged squared returns. At shorter lags, there 
is no clear pattern. But at longer lags beyond lag 50, the 
coefficients are predominantly positive, indicating a posi- 
tive association of long-run lagged individual stock return 
volatility and future returns. 
Figure 8 presents three series of monthly portfolio 
returns based on different versions of these regressions 
within 20-year rolling windows. The in-sample portfolio 
return, r IS , is based on a single OLS regression within a 
I.W.R. Martin and S. Nagel Journal of Financial Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: FINEC [m3Gdc; November 27, 2021;13:29 ] 










given window. The portfolio weights are proportional to
the predicted returns based on the OLS estimates as in
(3.1). Note that the portfolio weights are not normalized
to a certain dollar amount long or short. To interpret the
magnitude without this normalization, recall that r IS is
equal to the in-sample explained return variation of the
OLS regression. So, as shown in the figure, r IS of around
0.006%, compared with a monthly cross-sectional return
variance of around 0.6%, means that the OLS R 2 is around1%. 
19 To illustrate the empirical gap between r IS and an out- 
of-sample portfolio return, the figure also plots r OOS . To 
construct out-of-sample portfolio returns, we run rolling 
OLS regressions in 20-year estimation windows. We use 
the OLS estimates h t of the window ending in month t to 
forecast returns in month t + 1 . Given the 20-year estima- 
tion window and the up to 10-year lag of the predictors, 
the first month in which we have a prediction is January 
1956, 30 years after the start of the CRSP database. We 
use the estimates h t to calculate the out-of-sample port- 
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Fig. 8. Rolling estimates of the risk premium/mispricing component of returns. The risk premium component γ ′ X ′ X γ is estimated by the out-of-sample 
portfolio return r OOS,t+1 = r ′ t+1 X h t . We obtain the OLS estimates h t from regressions of individual stock returns on lagged returns and lagged squared returns 
in backwards 20-year moving windows up to month t and use them to construct weights applied to month t + 1 returns. Stocks with market capitalization 
below the 20th NYSE percentile and lagged price lower than one dollar are excluded. The blue line in the figure shows r OOS,t+1 averaged in 10-year moving 
windows. The shared area indicates two–standard error bands. For comparison, the figure also shows the in-sample return based on cross-validated ridge 
regression estimates, r CV , and OLS estimates, r IS . (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web 






























folio return in month t + 1 with weights proportional to
predicted returns as in (19) . The figure shows this out-of-
sample portfolio return averaged over 10-year moving win-
dows. 
As the figure shows, r IS is very stable across time and
reliably above zero. In contrast, the moving average of the
out-of-sample return r OOS is much lower and frequently
close to zero or below. The shaded area of the figure
shows two–standard error bands obtained from the mean
of squared monthly portfolio returns within the 10-year
moving windows, in line with our discussion following
Proposition 6 on estimation of var (r OOS,t+1 ) . Towards the
end of the sample, in the 10-year windows ending be-
tween 2014 and 2019, the out-of-sample portfolio return
has been less than two standard errors above zero. As we
noted in Section 3.4 , the average r OOS can be interpreted
as an estimate of γ ′ X ′ X γ , the contribution of risk pre-
mia (or return premia induced by behavioral biases or fric-
tions) to cross-sectional variation in expected returns. The
big wedge between r IS and r OOS shown in this figure under-
scores the message from our model that in-sample cross-
sectional return predictability evidence is not a good mo-
tivation for seeking risk-based or behavioral economic ex-
planations. Much of the in-sample predictability here does
not carry over into out-of-sample predictability and hence
does not reflect risk premia demanded by investors ex ante
or persistent belief distortions. 
The figure also plots r CV , the in-sample return on a
portfolio with weights proportional to predicted returns
from rolling cross-validated ridge regression estimates. Re-
call that our result in (26) suggested E r = E r . This re-OOS CV 
20 sult was based on cross-validated shrinkage with a penalty 
b ′ t X ′ X b t in (22) , while here we use standard ridge regres- 
sion shrinkage with a penalty on b ′ t b t . Nevertheless, as the 
figure shows, this equality approximately holds in the em- 
pirical data even with a somewhat different penalty spec- 
ification. Therefore, applying cross-validated ridge regres- 
sion shrinkage to the portfolio weights is a useful alterna- 
tive route to obtaining an estimate of γ ′ X ′ X γ . 
There are a number of concerns one might have about 
this analysis. First, would it not be possible to pick, ex 
post, a much smaller number of lags of simple and/or 
squared returns that happen to do better, in-sample and in 
the (pseudo-) out-of-sample tests from the rolling regres- 
sions? This may well be true. But what would be the ex 
ante justification to pick those specific lags? Why not oth- 
ers? Pursuing this avenue would inevitably introduce data 
snooping and multiple testing concerns that cloud the in- 
terpretation of the evidence. As an example, consider that 
the literature on momentum has shifted from emphasizing 
the returns in months t − 2 to t − 12 , as in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) , to highlighting returns in months t − 7 to 
t − 12 (Novy-Marx, 2012 ). It is not clear that one should 
seek deep economic reasons for in-sample predictability 
results that reflect such ex post data-driven specification 
changes. Simply including all lags up to a certain point and 
and letting the shrinkage take care of preventing overfit- 
ting minimizes this data-snooping problem. 
Second, out-of-sample tests may have low power to de- 
tect return predictability. This point has been made by 
Inoue and Kilian (2005) , Campbell and Thompson (2008) , 
and Hansen and Timmermann (2015) in a time-series set- 
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ting. However, their arguments are based on a rational ex-
pectations framework in which investors know the param-
eters of the data-generating process and only the econo-
metrician faces the problem of recovering its parameters
from observed data. In their case, in-sample and out-of-
sample methods test the same economic hypothesis. But
if investors are learning about parameters, especially in
settings where the number of potentially relevant predic-
tor variables is huge, the situation is fundamentally dif-
ferent. There is no fixed-parameter model that generates
each period’s returns. Instead, the properties of the data
evolve over time as investors learn. As a consequence,
in-sample and out-of-sample methods test different eco-
nomic hypotheses. In-sample predictability tests basically
lose the economic meaning they have in a rational ex-
pectations setting because they cannot discriminate be-
tween predictability induced by learning and predictabil-
ity induced by risk premia or behavioral biases. Only out-
of-sample tests can do so. For this reason, even if out-of-
sample tests have low power, in-sample tests are simply
not a viable alternative method, because they test a differ-
ent hypothesis without clear economic interpretation. 
8. Conclusion 
Our analysis provides a new perspective on markets
in which decision-makers face high-dimensional predic-
tion problems. Learning how to translate observed predic-
tor variables into forecasts is hard when the number of
predictors is comparable in size to the number of obser-
vations. To an econometrician studying these forecasts ex
post or the equilibrium prices that reflect these forecasts
the forecast errors look predictable. However, they are not
predictable to the decision-maker in real time. We devel-
oped this analysis in a cross-sectional asset-pricing appli-
cation, but the issue may be relevant more broadly in set-
tings in which large numbers of variables are potentially
relevant for forecasting. 
In the cross-sectional asset-pricing setting, in-sample
tests of return predictability lose their economic meaning
when investors are faced with many possible predictors of
asset cash flows. The usual economic interpretation that
in-sample predictable returns represent priced risks or the
effects of investors’ behavioral biases does not apply in this
case. This is not a statistical problem with the sampling
properties of the econometrician’s predictability tests. In-
stead, it is a problem with the null hypothesis in these
tests. As investors’ learning problem becomes harder with
increasing dimensionality of the set of potential predictors,
the true properties of equilibrium prices change. Even in
the absence of risk premia and behavioral biases, the usual
null hypothesis that returns are unpredictable need not ap-
ply. Investors’ learning of the cash flow–forecasting model
parameters leaves in-sample predictable components in re-
turns that reflect investors’ real-time estimation error and
the shrinkage they optimally apply to reduce it in a high-
dimensional setting. This is true even though we kept in-
vestors’ learning problem very simple: the potentially pre-
dictable component of future cash-flow growth is linear in
predictors, and investors know this linear functional form.
If investors also had to entertain that the functional form21 could be nonlinear, this would further magnify the dimen- 
sionality of the prediction problem they face. 
In contrast to in-sample tests, out-of-sample tests re- 
tain their economic meaning in the high-dimensional case. 
Our argument in favor of out-of-sample tests is differ- 
ent from those usually discussed in the econometrics 
literature. The usual case for out-of-sample tests moti- 
vates them as remedies against distortions of the sam- 
pling properties of in-sample tests or against data min- 
ing. As Inoue and Kilian (2005) , Campbell and Thomp- 
son (2008) , Cochrane (2008) , and Hansen and Timmer- 
mann (2015) have pointed out, the arguments in favor of 
out-of-sample testing are questionable in settings where 
the null hypothesis is a population model with truly un- 
predictable returns. Our point is that when investors face 
a high-dimensional forecasting problem, this is not an 
economically interesting null hypothesis. Absence of risk 
premia and behavioral biases implies absence of out-of- 
sample predictability but not of in-sample predictability. 
As investors arguably face a high-dimensional prediction 
problem in the real world, researchers should give more 
emphasis to out-of-sample testing. 
Our results offer a novel interpretation of the fact 
that in-sample return predictability tests in the literature 
have produced hundreds of variables that appear to pre- 
dict returns in the cross-section. As the number of pre- 
dictor variables that are available to researchers and in- 
vestors has grown enormously, it is to be expected, even 
with fully rational Bayesian investors, that returns should 
be predictable in hindsight from the perspective of an 
econometrician running in-sample regressions. Our results 
show that many such variables do indeed show up as in- 
sample statistically significant cross-sectional return pre- 
dictors. But it is not clear, in the absence of a clear the- 
oretical motivation for a predictor variable, or collection of 
variables, that one should look for risk-based explanations 
or behavioral explanations for their in-sample predictive 
power. 
A number of extensions of our work could be interest- 
ing. Our setting is a purely cross-sectional one with firm 
characteristics that are constant over time. But a similar 
learning problem also exists in the time dimension, e.g., at 
the aggregate stock market level. A huge number of macro 
variables could, jointly, be relevant for predicting aggre- 
gate stock market fundamentals. Furthermore, to keep the 
model simple and transparent, we have focused on learn- 
ing about exogenous fundamentals with homogeneous in- 
vestors. It would be interesting to extend this to a set- 
ting with heterogeneous investors. Balasubramanian and 
Yang (2020) make some progress in this direction by con- 
sidering privately informed investors who are uncertain 
about each others’ priors in a high-dimensional environ- 
ment. More generally, investor heterogeneity can generate 
a role for endogenous price-based signals from which in- 
vestors can extract information about not only asset fun- 
damentals but also the trading behavior of other investors. 
Appendix A. Proofs 
We first recall some notation and some basic facts that 
we will exploit throughout this appendix. We will use the 
I.W.R. Martin and S. Nagel Journal of Financial Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 





















X ′ X = Q Q ′ , (A.1)
and the definition 
t = Q 
(




Q ′ . (A.2)
It will be convenient for future use to note that (A.1) and
(A.2) imply that 
I − t = Q 
(








( I − t ) X ′ X = t . (A.4)
We will repeatedly exploit the fact that Q is orthogo-
nal (that is, Q Q ′ = Q ′ Q = I ) and  is diagonal. Note further
that diagonal matrices commute. Lastly, Assumption 4 im-
plies that (i) g = (θ/J) I , (ii) E ̄e t e ′ t = E e t ̄e ′ t = E ̄e t ̄e ′ t = 1 t I ,
(iii) E e t e 
′ 
t = I ; and, for s < t , (iv) E ̄e t e ′ s +1 = (1 /t) I , (v)
E e t+1 ̄e 
′ 
s = 0 , and (vi), E ̄e t ̄e ′ s = (1 /t) I . 
Proof of Proposition 1 . The result follows on making
Assumptions 1 and 3 in the Bayesian linear model of
Lindley and Smith (1972) . 
Proof of Proposition 2 . The realized return is 
r t+1 = y t+1 −p t = y t+1 −
[
y t + ̃  E t ( X g + e t+1 ) 
]
=y t+1 −X ̃  gt . 
From Assumption 1 and Eq. (6) , this becomes 
r t+1 = X g + e t+1 − X t ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ y t 
= X g + e t+1 − X t ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ [ X g + e t ] 
= X ( I − t ) g − X t ( X ′ X ) −1 X ′ e t + e t+1 . 
It follows that E r t+1 = 0 and 
E r t+1 r ′ t+1 = 
θ
J 




X ′ X 
)−1 
t X 
′ + I 
(A. 4) = θ
J 
X ( I − t ) 2 X ′ + θ
J 
X ( I − t ) t X ′ + I 
= θ
J 
X ( I − t ) X ′ + I , 
using (A.4) in the second line. 
Proof of Proposition 3 . We form h t+1 = 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ r t+1 and
then look at the in-sample return r ′ 
t+1 X 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ r t+1 =
h ′ t+1 X ′ X h t+1 . To think about the distribution of this quan-
tity, we first need to understand h t+1 itself. It is a
zero mean Normal random vector, and as E r t+1 r ′ t+1 =
θ
J X ( I − t ) X ′ + I by Proposition 2 , we have 




X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ E r t+1 r ′ t+1 X 
(





X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ X ( I − t ) X ′ X 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 + (X ′ X )−
= θ
J 
( I − t ) + 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
. 22 Using Eqs. (A.1) and (A.3) , this can be rewritten as 
N E h t+1 h 
′ 








︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
t 
Q ′ . 
If we define u t+1 = 
√ 
N −1 / 2 t Q 
′ h t+1 , then 
√ 
N h t+1 = 
Q 1 / 2 t u t+1 and u t+1 is standard Normal: E u t+1 u 
′ 
t+1 = 
N −1 / 2 t Q 
′ 1 
N Q t Q 
′ Q −1 / 2 t = I (using orthogonality of Q ). 












Q 1 / 2 t u t+1 ︸ ︷︷ ︸ √ 
N h t+1 
= u ′ t+1 1 / 2 t 1 / 2 t u t+1 
= u ′ t+1 t u t+1 . 
The last line exploits the fact that 1 / 2 and  commute, 
as they are diagonal. 









i , (A.5) 
where ζi,t are the diagonal entries of the diagonal matrix 
t  and u i are independent N(0 , 1) random variables (the 
entries of u t+1 ). Explicitly, 
ζi,t = ω i,t λi = 
λi 
tλi + J θN 
+ 1 . (A.6) 
As λi > 0 by positive definiteness of X 
′ X , it follows that 
for t ≥ 1 , ζi,t ∈ (1 , 2) . Moreover, as lim J,N→∞ J N = ψ > 0 and 
(by Assumption 5 ) λi > ε, ζi,t is uniformly bounded away 
from 1 and 2. It follows that μ ∈ (1 , 2) and 
√ 
μ2 + σ 2 ∈ 
(1 , 2) . 
We will apply Lyapunov’s version of the central limit 
theorem to 
∑ J 
i =1 ζi,t u 
2 
i 
, which here requires that for some 











[ ∣∣u 2 i − 1 ∣∣2+ δ] = 0 where 
s 2 J = 2 
J ∑ 
i =1 
ζ 2 i,t . 





− 1) 4 
]






ζ 4 i,t E 






)2 ≤ 960 J 4 J 2 → 0 
as J → ∞ , 
as required. Therefore the central limit theorem applies 
for h ′ t+1 X ′ X h t+1 = 
∑ J 
i =1 ζi,t u 
2 
i 
after appropriate standard- 
ization by mean and variance, which (as the u i are IID 
standard Normal) are 
∑ J 











′ X h t+1 −
∑ J 






d −→ N(0 , 1) . 
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The remaining results follow immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 4 . The first statement follows from the
second. To prove the second, note that Proposition 3 im-
plies that 
P ( T re < c α) = P 
⎛ ⎝ T re √ 
μ2 + σ 2 
− μ − 1 √ 
2 
(




μ2 + σ 2 
− μ − 1 √ 
2 
(




⎛ ⎝ c α√ 
μ2 + σ 2 
− μ − 1 √ 
2 
(
μ2 + σ 2 
)√ J 
⎞ ⎠ , 
where (·) denotes the standard Normal cumulative dis-
tribution function. The result follows from the well-known
inequalities e 
−x 2 / 2 ∣∣x + 1 x ∣∣√ 2 π < (x ) < e −x 
2 / 2 
| x | √ 2 π , which hold for x <
0 . 
Proof of Proposition 5 . When t > 0 , the cross-sectional mo-
ments of ζ j,t can be computed using Eq. (14) and the fact
that the eigenvalues λ j follow (in the asymptotic limit) the
Marchenko-Pastur distribution, whose probability density
function f λ(x ) takes the form 





























, and f λ(x ) = 0 elsewhere.
The relevant integrals can be calculated explicitly, giving
Eqs. (17) and (18) ; and we can calculate the probability
density function of ζ j,t in the asymptotic limit by change
of variable using the relation between ζ j,t and λ j given in
Eq. (A.6) . 
Proof of Proposition 6 . We first show that E r OOS,t+1 = 0 . As
h s +1 = 
(
X ′ X 
)−1 
X ′ r s +1 , we have 
E 
[
r t+1 ( X h s +1 ) 
′ ] = E [r t+1 r ′ s +1 ]X (X ′ X )−1 X ′ . 
We will show that E 
[
r t+1 r ′ s +1 
]
= 0 when s  = t; in other
words, all non-contemporaneous autocorrelations and
cross-correlations are zero. Henceforth we assume that s <
t without loss of generality. From Eq. (8) , 
E 
[




X ( I − t )( I −s ) X ′ + 1 
t 
X t ( X 
′ X ) −1 s X ′ 
−1 
t 
X t ( X 
′ X ) −1 X ′ . 
This expression can be rearranged as 
E 
[








( I −t ) X ′ X − t 
]
( X ′ X ) −1 ( I − s ) X ′
As θt J ( I − t ) X ′ X = t by Eq. (A.4) , the term in square
brackets on the right-hand side vanishes, and the result
follows. 23 We now turn to the asymptotic distribution. As 
r ′ t+1 X h s +1 = h ′ t+1 X ′ X h s +1 , we want to understand the 
behavior of h t+1 X ′ X h s +1 where s < t . Defining u t+1 = √ 
N −1 / 2 t Q 
′ h t+1 , as in the proof of Proposition 3 , we have √ 
N h t+1 = Q 1 / 2 t u t+1 and E u t+1 u ′ t+1 = I . We also have 
E u s +1 u ′ t+1 = 0 whenever s  = t (because, as shown above, 
E r s +1 r ′ t+1 = 0 and hence E h s +1 h ′ t+1 = 0 ). Thus u t+1 and 





′ X h s +1 = u ′ t+1 1 / 2 t Q ′ Q Q ′ Q 1 / 2 s u s +1 
= u ′ t+1 1 / 2 t 1 / 2 s u s +1 . 
As 1 / 2 t 
1 / 2 
s is a J × J diagonal matrix with i th diagonal 
entry 
√ 








ζi,t ζi,s w i , 
where w i denotes the product of the i th entries of u t+1 and 
u s +1 . The w i are independent of each other, and each is the 
product of two independent standard Normal random vari- 
ables. Therefore each w i has zero mean and unit variance. 
We wish to apply Lyapunov’s version of the central 




ζi,t ζi,s w i , which here requires that 









[∣∣∣√ ζi,t ζi,s w i ∣∣∣2+ δ] = 0 
where s 2 J = 
J ∑ 
i =1 
ζi,t ζi,s . 
It is enough to show that this holds when δ = 2 . In this 
case, as the fourth moment of a standard Normal random 












[∣∣∣√ ζi,t ζi,s w i ∣∣∣4 ] = 9 ∑ J i =1 ζ 2 i,t ζ 2 i,s (∑ J 
i =1 ζi,s ζi,t 
)2 ≤ 144 J J 2 → 0 
as J → ∞ . 
(The inequality follows because ζi,t ∈ (1 , 2) for all i 
and t ≥ 1 .) Hence the central limit theorem applies for ∑ J 
i =1 
√ 
ζi,t ζi,s w i after appropriate standardization by mean 
and variance, which are 0 and 
∑ J 





′ X h s +1 √ ∑ J 
i =1 ζi,t ζi,s 
d −→ N(0 , 1) . 

Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can 
be found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco. 
2021.10.006 . 
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